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Abstract
In the early 1920s, Hans Reichenbach and Kurt Lewin presented two topo-
logical accounts of time that appear to be interrelated in more than one re-
spect. Despite their different approaches, their underlying idea is that time
order is derived from specific structural properties of the world. In both
works, moreover, the notion of genidentity–i.e., identity through or over
time–plays a crucial role. Although it is well known that Reichenbach bor-
rowed this notion from Kurt Lewin, not much has been written about their
relationship, nor about the way Lewin implemented this notion in his own
work in order to ground his topology. This paper examines these two early
versions of the topology of time, and follows the extent of Lewin’s influence
on Reichenbach’s proposal.
Keywords: Genidentity, topology of time, causal theory of time, relativized
a priori, Kurt Lewin, Hans Reichenbach.
1 Introduction
Kurt Lewin and Hans Reichenbach have been central figures in the birth of logical
empiricism as well as in the Berlin Group. As with many of their colleagues, their
acquaintance goes back to the time of their involvement within the German youth
movement known as “Freistudentenschaft”, before World War I. At that time, they
had close contact on matters related to their curriculum of studies, as we shall see
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in Sect. 2. In the early 1920s, they were among those who tackled the issue of the
definition of time order. Starting from different considerations, they developed
two original accounts of the topology of time, which display interesting affinities.
In Sect. 3, I will compare these accounts and thus address some historical and
theoretical questions they raise.
Before going on, let us first clarify in what sense we will use the term “topol-
ogy” in this paper. Here, this term is referred not to the usual notions of topology
but rather to the objective system of relations and coincidences of point-events that
can be established before any metrical determination, thereby independent of any
arbitrariness. In fact, both Reichenbach and Lewin were engaged in the attempt
to derive the truth of a number of temporal propositions from the occurrence of
characteristic and elementary phenomena in the world. The topological relations
defined in their works did not merely portray some representational artefact. On
the contrary, what these two constructions intended to capture was an “ultimate
fact” of nature.1
A common feature of these two accounts is that they both crucially make use–
implicitly or explicitly–of the notion of “genidentity” (i.e., identity through/over
time). The basic questions they address can be sketched as follows: 1) When
are two events genidentical, that is, involving the same thing? 2) When are two
genidentical events one before the other, or else simultaneous? 3) When are two
non-genidentical events one before the other, or else simultaneous? The critical
element of divergence is that Reichenbach aimed to illustrate the temporal order
of physically possible events, whereas Lewin dealt with the ordering of actual
events.
Reichenbach first mentioned the concept of “genidentity” in his Relativita¨ts-
theorie und Erkenntnis apriori (1920), where it was regarded as a synthetic, yet
revisable a priori principle. In this book, genidentity represented a very special
principle of coordination of formal structures to reality required in order to iden-
tify an object as the selfsame object in the passage through time. In the shift to-
ward a conventionalist stance that Reichenbach notoriously embraced soon after
1920, coordinating principles would be turned into either coordinative (conven-
tional) definitions or epistemological and methodological principles. However,
the principle of genidentity was dropped in this passage. In both his “Bericht”
(1921b) and Axiomatik (1924), Reichenbach took the notion of “light signal” as
the basis from which to derive the topological properties of (space-)time. By do-
ing so, the key idea behind the principle of genidentity was dissolved into what
will be later known as “the mark principle” (Sect. 3.2).
In Der Begriff der Genese (1922), Lewin used the notion of genidentity pri-
marily as a sort of analytic tool to pursue his project of comparative sciences. In
1Reichenbach (1928/1958, 285). Cf. also Ryckman (2007, 205 ff.).
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the following publication on this topic, “Die zeitliche Geneseordnung” (1923a),
he addressed the question of the possibility of erecting a temporal topology only
on the basis of certain most elementary features of reality. Thus, he proposed
a topological account of time by taking the existential relation implied by gen-
identity as primitive (Sect. 3.1). With respect to Reichenbach’s attempt, Lewin’s
approach turned out to involve a more fundamental level of analysis that Rei-
chenbach should have considered given his claim that his axiomatic construction
starts with the most elementary facts. In their correspondence of the early 1920s,
which we shall briefly analyse in 3.2.2, Lewin will argue that Reichenbach’s no-
tion of “first signal” can, and actually should, be decomposed and reduced to its
constituents. According to Lewin, the notion of “identity through time” as an
existential relation is a primitive notion that must be presupposed even before
considering any physical process, such as a light signal. The concept of signal,
to Lewin’s mind, already conveys the sense of some thing propagating through
time and, therefore, requires a prior principle of temporal individuation that his
formalised concept of genidentity is meant to provide.
As a result of this exchange, the principle of genidentity will be reintroduced in
Reichenbach’s work, notably in his Die Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre (1928),
where it will be surprisingly defined as an “empirical principle” (Sect. 4). In
this conclusive Section, I will also briefly emphasise the importance of Lewin’s
influence on Reichenbach’s first attempt to define the direction of time in “Die
Kausalstruktur der Welt” (1925), and I will finally suggest that this principle still
holds a peculiar position in Reichenbach’s later work, more precisely as a consti-
tutive principle.
2 Crossed Destinies: from the Youth Movements to
the ErlangenMeeting, through theWireless Teleg-
raphy
Like many of their German contemporaries, while they were attending university,
Lewin and Reichenbach took part in the activities of a student movement known as
Freistudentenschaft. It was essentially a libertarian, egalitarian, anti-racist, anti-
authoritarian, estheticist, and non-traditionalist movement, in certain respects also
anti-militarist. Oriented by the idea of the moral self-determination of the indi-
viduals and of the freedom of directing one’s own future, this movement stood
against any form of dogmatism, be it scholastic, religious, philosophical, political
or institutional.2 Like Lewin, Reichenbach joined the Freistudentenschaft around
2For an analysis of the birth and development of the German student movement, cf. Wipf
(2004). To have an idea of Reichenbach’s active contribution to the activities of this group, see
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1910, and his adhesion to the ideals of this group later developed into a prominent
political commitment with socialist groups.3
Reichenbach’s relation to Kurt Lewin dates back to at least 1911. It was
likely on the occasion of the 1911 national Berlin meeting of this association that
they must have first met.4 In the summer of that year, they started a correspon-
dence on matters related to education in German universities. In the only letter of
this early exchange that was preserved,5 Lewin warmly responded to what must
have been Reichenbach’s inquiry about the situation of scientific psychology (wis-
senschaftliche Psychologie) in German universities, especially in Berlin, Munich
and Go¨ttingen, i.e., the three universities where Reichenbach actually spent the
following four years.6
also Wipf (1994) and Maria Reichenbach’s introductory remarks to Reichenbach (1978: Vol. I,
91–101). An overview of Lewin’s involvement can be found in Ash (1995, 265 ff.).
3In 1918, Reichenbach drew the programme of the socialist student party and published a
number of pamphlets distributed in alternative circles. Cf. Reichenbach (1978: Vol. I, 132–185).
4Reichenbach presented two papers that would be published as (1911a) and (1911b).
5In what follows, I will mainly refer to material from the Hans Reichenbach Collection (HR)
available at the Archives for Scientific Philosophy (ASP) of Pittsburgh and Konstanz, except from
one letter from the Moritz Schlick Collection at the Wiener Kreis Stichting in Amsterdam. All the
material is quoted by permission of the University of Pittsburgh and the Wiener Kreis Stichting.
All rights are reserved.
6Lewin recommended Reichenbach to go to Munich rather than to Berlin, and to refer to the
local section of the free student body, motivating his advice on the lack of interesting professors in
Berlin, on the one hand, and on the opportunities that the Munich surroundings offered for skiing
on the other [“Berlin kann ich Ihnen gar nicht empfehlen, wohl aber Mu¨nchen fu¨r den Winter.
Treten Sie in die Abteilung der M.[u¨nchener] Fr.[eien]St.[udentenschaft] ein [. . . ] und lernen Sie
skilaufen.” (ASP, HR 023-13-31, Lewin to Reichenbach, 29 September 1911)]. To be sure, Lewin
described the situation of the studies in psychology in Germany as not exciting at all. For exam-
ple, Theodor Lipps is portrayed as an old man, almost never teaching and in general unable to de-
liver good lectures, despite having written a good textbook. Alexander Pfa¨nder, student of Lipps,
is presented as a good philosopher, yet with too little knowledge of scientific psychology (von
naturwissenschaftlichen Psychologie). Georg Elias Mu¨ller appears to be one of the few having a
scientific approach and as well as being truly engaged in teaching specific chapters of psychology.
In Lewin’s view, Hans Rupp was not particularly good as teacher, but provided the students with
useful exercises, so that he seemed the only one really promoting psychology in Berlin. Curiously,
the worst picture Lewin drew is that of one his own future supervisor, Carl Stumpf, described as
teaching poorly and boringly [“ich kann Sie versichern, er taugt nichts und ist obendrein sprach-
lich langweilig”]. These discouraging words notwithstanding, besides philosophy and traditional
mathematical-physical classes, Reichenbach will attend Stumpf’s course Psychologie mit Demon-
strationen and Rupp’s Experimentelle U¨bungen zur Psychologie in the 1911-12 winter semester
in Berlin (ASP, HR 041-09-16). He will instead go to Munich the following academic year, and
indeed become a member of the local division of the Freie Studentenschaft, with a specific focus
on psychological research. Whether and how Lewin was influential in making Reichenbach turn
at first directly to philosophy is difficult to say. But it may be a consequence of Lewin’s positive
appreciation of Mu¨ller if Reichenbach first (unsuccessfully) tried to have him as his supervisor in
Go¨ttingen.
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Both Lewin and Reichenbach attended Ernst Cassirer’s and Carl Stumpf’s lec-
tures at the University of Berlin at different times, and were variously influenced
by them. As an experimental psychologist, Stumpf was a pioneer also in ex-
perimenting with tones, and in the psychology of acoustic perception—teachings
that would soon reveal to be important for both of them. After a short period
on the Russian front line, Reichenbach served for almost two years in the signal
corps of the German army in Neuruppin, not far from Berlin.7 Like Reichen-
bach, Lewin volunteered and served in the army, until he was injured in combat
in 1917.8 When he was transferred near Berlin, he was assigned to the construc-
tion of devices for sound measurement. Respectively, they brought their scientific
and technical competences in the context of the new situation that was originat-
ing at the front, where various scientific fields proved to be of pivotal importance
in solving a variety of military problems. Also psychologists contributed to this
endeavour especially by providing skill tests in order to select the most suitable
individuals for each specific military task.9 It is in the spirit of these synergies that
in this period Reichenbach collaborated with Kurt Lewin and Otto Lipmann—one
of the first to apply the new research tendencies in psychology to the industrial
problems, and co-founder, with William Stern, of the Zeitschrift fu¨r angewandte
Psychologie—on the development of an aptitude test for radio telegraphists.10
During the years 1918–1920, Lewin and Reichenbach were both in Berlin.
Reichenbach was employed in the Huth radio industry,11 while attending Ein-
stein’s lectures on statistical mechanics, special and general relativity.12 Lewin
7Cf. Gerner (1997, ch. 2.3.)
8See Marrow (1969, 10–11).
9Mitchell Ash illustrates this state of affairs in the following way: “The First World War saw
the emergence of the technological battlefield, and it also marked a turning point in the interaction
of technology and basic science. In numerous ways scientists demonstrated the usefulness of basic
research by employing laboratory instruments and techniques to solve military problems, from the
development of sound-ranging devices in physics to that of poison gas in chemistry. Psychologists
in Germany participated in this process by adapting psychophysical measurement to skills testing
for the selection of communications specialists, pilots, and drivers. The focus of these efforts was
on the ‘human factor’—on the human organism as a functioning part of a machine. Practitioners
in the new field called ‘psychotechnics’ searched for the machine operators whose skills were best
suited to the task in question—whose reactive idiosyncrasies, that is, interfered least with efficient
functioning.” Ash (1995, 188).
10This document, entitled “Entwurf zu einer Eignungspru¨fung fu¨r Funkentelegraphisten” and
signed by Lewin, Lippmann, and Reichenbach, was completed in 1917 (ASP, HR 024-16-02).
11His work focussed on particular amplifying valves. See, for instance, some of his more tech-
nical writings of the period like “Statistisches Verfahren zur Beurteilung von Versta¨rkerro¨hren”
(ASP, HR 044-03-21), “Zur Theorie der Versta¨rkerro¨hren” (ASP, HR 044-03-23), and “Beschrei-
bung des Huth’schen Versta¨rkers L. 43 F. 25m Niederspannung-Versta¨rker” (ASP, HR 044-03-25).
12Cf. Reichenbach’s five corresponding lecture notebooks (ASP, HR 028-01-01/05), as well as
Gerner (1997, ch. 2).
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was a member of the Institute of Psychology, around which, in contrast to the
traditional Wundtian approaches, Stumpf gathered the future leading figures in
this new direction in experimental and applied psychology, like Wolfgang Ko¨hler,
Kurt Koffka, and Max Wertheimer, all embracing the ideas of Gestalt psychol-
ogy. At that time, Lewin was working on a lengthy monograph on the concept of
“genetic series” that he unsuccessfully tried to submit as his Habilitation thesis to
obtain the qualification for teaching philosophy at the University of Berlin.13 The
thesis would not be published until 1922, as we shall see in the next section.
After being bestowed the teaching Habilitation for physics with his Rela-
tivita¨tstheorie und Erkenntnis apriori (1920), Reichenbach was first appointed
assistant to the physicist Erick Regener, and soon after “Privatdozent” (a sort of
associate professor) at the Stuttgart Technische Hochschule. During the entire
period in Stuttgart, Reichenbach kept in touch with Lewin for discussions con-
cerning not only philosophical issues, but also one of the most important events in
the early phases of logical empiricism, the famous Erlangen conference of 1923,
in which both Reichenbach and Lewin participated. One of the issues discussed
during that meeting was the creation of a journal for exact philosophy that was
only realised with the publication of the first issue of Erkenntnis in 1930. Lewin
was one of the most active among those who were engaged in the organisation of
this periodical, as an intense correspondence with Reichenbach demonstrates.14
Other important topics of debate were the comparative theory of sciences, the ax-
iomatic method in physics, and the topology of time. Each of these discussions
was of clear significance to both of them, and they would lead to further exchanges
of views. Despite their different approach, their topological accounts of time will
have a common denominator: the use—explicit or not—of the principle of gen-
identity as fundamental.
3 The Many Faces of Genidentity
The term “genidentity” was coined by Lewin in the Habilitation thesis that he
wrote (but did not publish) in 1920, but was officially introduced in 1922 in (what
seems to be) the revised version of this thesis that was published under the title
Der Begriff der Genese in Physik, Biologie und Entwicklungsgeschichte (1922).
To be sure, the first time this term appears in a publication is in Reichenbach’s
1920 book on relativity theory. In this book, Reichenbach explicitly refers to
13Carl Stumpf also supervised his Habilitation thesis. References to the history of this mono-
graph, and the difficulties that Lewin had to face in order to receive that qualification with this
treatise can be found in Me´traux’s introduction to Lewin (1983) and in Me´traux (1992).
14From July 1923 to October 1924 they exchanged about twenty letters, almost exclusively
related to the creation of their journal. See ASP, HR 016-36-07/26.
6
Lewin’s Die Verwandtschaftsbegriffe in Biologie und Physik und die Darstellung
vollsta¨ndiger Stammba¨ume (1920)–where this term actually does not appear–and
to another book by Lewin seemingly dealing with the order type of genetic series
in various domains. Reichenbach refers to the latter book as being entitled Der
Ordnungstypus der genetischen Reihen in Physik, organismischer Biologie und
Entwicklungsgeschichte. However, this work does not appear to have ever been
published, although Reichenbach even names a publisher (Borntraeger, Berlin).
Presumably, this was the original title of Lewin’s unpublished thesis, which Rei-
chenbach must have read in draft while they were both in Berlin. In these early
years, they were certainly very close, and most likely often discussing their re-
spective researches. It is not a coincidence, in fact, if a few years later Reichen-
bach recalled that Lewin, along with Einstein, were the two persons to whom he
showed the drafts of his relativity book.15 In this work, he borrows the concept of
genidentity from Lewin, but develops his account in a different fashion.
In what follows, I shall compare the meanings and roles assigned to geniden-
tity in the works of the two authors. We will see how the differences account for
two distinct topologies of time.
3.1 The Concept of Genidentity in Kurt Lewin
Lewin’s first publication to tackle the problem of the order type deriving from par-
ticular sequences called “genetic” is Die Verwandtschaftsbegriffe in Biologie und
Physik und die Darstellung vollsta¨ndiger Stammba¨ume.16 This is a study of some
specific relationships in different sciences, namely biology and physics (where
physics is interpreted in a very loose sense, including—and at times, identifying
with—chemistry)17 and represents his first treatise of comparative sciences.
The gist of Lewin’s work is to identify a certain (genetic) type of order (Ord-
nungstypus) in these sciences, an order that is characteristically exemplified, for
instance, by the relationship of relatedness in biology and that of affinity in chem-
istry. Lewin shows how these relationships can be represented through family
15In some autobiographical notes written in 1927, Reichenbach reconstructed the circumstances
in which he wrote his own Habilitation thesis with the following words: “Im Februar (oder Ma¨rz)
1920 beschloss ich, meine Habilitationsschrift zu schreiben. Ich hatte in den Monaten vorher
Relth. gearbeitet, auch nach Weyl; den Grund hatte ich schon in 1917–1918 in Vorlesungen bei
Einstein gelegt, aus welchen meine Kenntnis der Th.[eorie] herru¨hrt.[. . . ] Die Schrift ist in etwa
10 Tagen niedergeschrieben. Das M[anu]s[kript] wurde dann abgetippt. Ich zeigte es Einstein u.
Lewin. Durch Berliners Vermittl[un]g kam es zu Springer. Erschienen ist es im Sept. 1920, zum
Naturforschertag.” ASP, HR 044-06-23.
16Lewin (1920). The foreword is dated March 31, 1920.
17As Lewin declares in the first lines, “[i]n der Physik, worunter hier die Physik im weiteren
Sinne des Wortes verstanden wird, wird der Begriff der Verwandtschaft im allgemeinen fu¨r die
chemische Verwandtschaft benutzt.” Lewin (1920, 5).
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trees. In particular, analysing biological pedigrees, he focusses on the genealog-
ical relation, necessarily asymmetric, between ancestors and progeny, which he
terms “genetic series” (Genetische Reihe). In general, a genetic series is an ef-
fectual relation of antecedency of the type “being-such-as-to-have-come-forth-
from”.18 Interestingly, Lewin’s investigation is carried out with a sort of mere-
ological approach in which the sequences are compared with the whole of the
formations they belong to.19
In spite of the title of this essay, the corresponding relation of existence that
could obviously be thought of in physics is not considered by Lewin. In one
passage, though, he highlights an essential aspect that characterises the physical
sequences, that is, their continuity and extension towards infinity along their both
sides, which illustrates a relation of complete (restlos) derivation among each and
every slice.20 What this type of derivation means is better specified by Lewin
only in (1922) with the expression “complete physical genidentity”, as we shall
see below, p. 10.
Lewin introduces and expounds on the notion of “genidentity” in Der Begriff
der Genese (1922), where it is embedded in a much larger project of compara-
tive sciences than the first research of 1920. More than underlining commonali-
ties among sciences, Lewin’s comparative approach also highlights the sciences’
specificities. What is compared and studied are not similar objects (Objecte) per
se but objects displaying an equivalence from the viewpoint of the theoretical
knowledge we have of them, that is, what he defines as “wissenschaftstheoretisch
a¨quivalente” Objecte.21 The aim of this more extensive research is to show that,
18“Die Existentialbeziehung, die in der Biologie als Verwandtschaft bezeichnet wird, kann ein-
mal zwischen Gebilden bestehen, die auseinander hervorgegangen sind, z. B. zwischen Kind
und Eltern oder Großeltern, oder zweitens zwischen Gebilden, die gemeinsame Vorfahren oder
Nachkommen besitzen, ohne selbst voneinander abzustammen. Auf die Existentialbeziehung
zwischen Vorfahren und Nachkommen, das existentielle Auseinanderhervorgegangensein im
Nacheinander, soll hier nicht na¨her eingegangen werden.” Lewin (1920, 20). The reference goes
to the above-mentioned forthcoming more extended research.
19This approach will be cast in more formal terms in his following publication on this topic, Der
Begriff der Genese (1922). Analyses and discussions brought up in mereological terms were quite
frequent in Stumpf’s circle. For an account of the theory of the whole/part relations in Stumpf and
his school, cf. Smith & Mulligan (1982).
20“In der Physik handelt es sich, wie hier nicht weiter ausgefu¨hrt werden kann, um einen kon-
tinuierlichen, beiderseits ins Unendliche gehenden Reihentypus. Es ist ein wesentliches Charakter-
istikum dieser Reihen kontinuierlich aufeinander folgender Schnitte, daß es auch zu jedem beliebig
herausgegriffenen Teil eines Schnittes eine solche beiderseits unendliche Reihe von Schnitten gibt,
mit denen er in der Beziehung des restlosen existentiellen Auseinanderhervorgegangenseins steht.”
Lewin (1920, 21).
21It goes without saying that the main source of inspiration for this approach is Cassirer’s fa-
mous monograph Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff (1910). As Lewin wrote in 1920: “Diese
die Vergleichbarkeit begru¨ndende wissenschaftstheoretische A¨quivalenz, die sich auf die ganze
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in spite of certain structural similarities that can be identified in such objects, they
exhibit different modalities of application in the compared sciences. In 1922, this
aim is pursued by investigating how the concept of genidentity functions and the
way it acquires its meaning within various domains.
The concept of genidentity is again essentially characterised in mereological
terms. Objects or events are temporally extended, thus their genetic series con-
sists of a multitude of entities, representing their various phases at various times.
According to Lewin, physical constructs (Gebilde) that have developed one from
the other can be conceived as temporally distinct, so that we can define the rela-
tion of genidentity as the existential relation that holds between them.22 Here we
won’t follow Lewin’s complex treatment of the multiplicity of relations that can
be subsumed under this same concept. To just give an idea of some different but
related notions of genidentity, let us take a classical example that Reichenbach
also briefly mentions in his (1924c, 189). Between the egg and the hen there is a
relation of biological genidentity in that they represent different stages of devel-
opment of the same biological matter: they are slices of the same genetic series
connecting the selfsame individual along a temporal sequence. From a physical
viewpoint, though, they are not genidentical because the molecules composing
them have changed. Besides, a physical genetic series can lead from the egg to
the variety of other formations that can be developed from it, so it may also bring
forth, say, a piece of cake.
These various ways of “cutting” reality into units reflect the different angles
from which to analyse real objects or processes in temporal perspective. In (1922),
Lewin introduces a different terminology to distinguish the multiplicity of genetic
series, like the biological from the physical genidentity. For instance, the biolog-
ical relation of genidentity between an individual and his or her descendants is
defined as “avalgenidentity”, whereas the relation of genidentity holding among
successive temporal sections of individuals–whole organisms, but also cells–is
called “individual genidentity”. While the relations of genidentity used in these
Stellung der Vergleichsobjekte in den betreffenden Wissenschaften stu¨tzt, kann nicht durch ir-
gendwelche a¨ußerliche U¨bereinstimmungen ersetzt oder durch a¨ußerliche Ungleichheiten wider-
legt werden. Die wissenschaftstheoretische A¨quivalenz bestimmter Begriffsgebilde oder Ein-
teilungsprinzipien in verschiedenen Wissenschaften bedeutet daher auch umgekehrt noch keine
vo¨llige Gleichheit der betreffenden Vergleichsobjekte oder gar eine Identita¨t der betreffenden Wis-
senschaften.” Lewin (1920, 3). See also Lewin (1925).
22“Physikalische Gebilde, die zu verschiedenen Zeitmomente existieren, sollen also als eine
Mehrheit von Gebilden aufgefaßt werden, nicht anders als gewisse ra¨umlich verschiedene Gebilde.
[. . . ] Physikalische Gebilde, die auseinander hervorgegangen sind, mu¨ssen, abgesehen von an-
deren mo¨glichen Unterschieden, jedenfalls zeitlich verschieden sein. Wir wollen, um Verwech-
slungen zu vermeiden, die Beziehung, in der Gebilde stehen, die existentiell auseinander her-
vorgegangen sind, Genidentita¨t nennen. Dieser Terminus soll nicht anderes bezeichnen als die
genetische Existentialbeziehung als solche.” Lewin (1922/1983, 60–62).
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domains may show some affinities, they do not share the same properties when
implemented in different contexts. Every science represents a specific, closed
network of interrelated concepts that cannot simply be extrapolated and applied
within other networks. Hence, the passage from one science to the other implies
an ideal partitioning of reality.23
For our discussion, the relation of physical genidentity is the most salient one,
as it represents a good candidate to determine temporal sequences. We have seen
above that in (1920) Lewin briefly mentions an important feature of sequences in
physics, that is, the relation of complete derivation among genetic slices of phys-
ical events. This relation of complete derivation is now elaborated and presented
as “complete genidentity”. Roughly, the idea is that physical constructs are in a
relation of complete genidentity when none of their own other parts stands in a
relation of genidentity with some other construct.24 In general, the completeness
(Restlosigkeit) of the physical, genidentical relation can be understood, Lewin
explains, as typically presupposed by the activity of experimenting in physics,
where it is ideally required that physical systems be in isolation from external dis-
turbances. For cases where complete genidentity does not apply but an existential
relation of partial antecedency can still be identified, Lewin speaks of “simple gen-
identity” (Genidentita¨t u¨berhaupt). Simple genidentity is the relation that holds
between constructs that share at least one part correlated by complete genidentity.
For example, consider the case of a piece of metal that is plunged into a liquid at
a time t1 and is found altered afterwards, say at a time t2. If you then remove a
part of the liquid, you will have to suppose that something of the metal that was
partially dissolved in it has also been removed. Hence, the remains of the metal
at the time t2 will stand in a relation of complete genidentity with the parts of the
metal they belonged to at the time t1, but the whole formation cannot be accounted
for through genidentical completeness.25
In general, physical genidentity does not consider qualitative differences in the
properties of related objects, but mainly takes into account their temporal differ-
23Lewin (1922/1983, 131 ff.). For example, the relation of complete physical genidentity is
characterised by: 1) continuity in the passage between the correlated constructs; 2) independence
of the relation from the direction of the series (symmetry); 3) independence from the distance
between the slices along a sequence; and 4) exclusion of a partially unconnected construct simul-
taneously existing with one of two completely genidentical slices that is simply genidentical with
the other one. Cf. Lewin (1922/1983, 89–90). Thus, complete physical genidentity has transitivity,
temporal density, and continuity as properties, whereas avalgenidentity presupposes discontinuity,
lack of density, and some further conditions for transitivity. See Lewin (1922/1983, 158 ff.).
24“Ein physikalisches Gebilde a1 ist restlos genidentisch mit a2, wenn 1) im Zeitpunkt 1 kein zu
a1 teilfremdes physikalisches Gebilde (Teil eines Gebilde) existiert, das mit a2 in Genidentita¨ts-
beziehung steht, und wenn 2) im Zeitpunkt 2 kein zu a2 teilfremdes physikalisches Gebilde (Teil
eines Gebildes) existiert, das mit a1 in Genidentita¨tsbeziehung steht.” Lewin (1922/1983, 82).
25Lewin (1922/1983, 84 ff.).
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ences. Nonetheless, the order of genidentical formations cannot be traced back to
a temporal order. The concept of genetic series is indeed more fundamental than
the one of temporal order that can be drawn from it.26 This type of order is not to
be understood in terms of an external order that can be used to determine tempo-
ral relations among objects or events. As a matter of fact, it captures an internal,
immediate, and most fundamental relation of the objects (or events) considered.27
In this sense, it can be deemed a constitutive category (constitutive Kategorie)28
pertaining to the existence relation.
Consequently, physical genidentity gives rise to a specific type of order, namely
the existential relationship expressed in the concept of the “one-after-the-other”
(im Nacheinander).29 The idea behind this genetic type of order will be borrowed
by Reichenbach as a model for a temporal topology, as we shall see in the next
subsection. Interestingly, Lewin also addresses this question in his “Die zeitliche
Geneseordnung” (1923a), where he proposes a temporal topology—still construed
in mereological terms—based on the notion of a genetic series and time order of
actual events. The theory of relativity, he explains in the introductory remarks,
employs light signals for the determination of the temporal relations. In particu-
lar, for its construction it makes use of a specific property, constancy (Konstanz),
of a specific physical process, the propagation of light. In the Minkowski system
of world lines, the point of intersection of the event series is uniquely determined.
Even so, for Lewin the assignment of all those world lines to concrete objects
fundamentally relies on an existential relation. The subsumption under a specific
world line actually depends on the relation of historical derivation (geschichtliche
Herkunft) of an event from another and does not depend on other features like
equal measure or energy. For this relation of historical derivation, expressed by a
genetic series, all other determinations (measure, velocity, volume, and in general
all physical values of the members of the series) are not decisive. The essential
26“[Die] Zeitverschiedenheit der Relata [bildet] eine notwendige Voraussetzung fu¨r das
Vorliegen der physikalischen Genidentita¨tsbeziehung zwischen ihnen. Diese Verschiedenheit
bezieht sich jedoch nicht auf solche mit der Zeit zusammenha¨ngenden “Eigenschaften” wie die
Geschwindigkeit, sondern lediglich auf die Verschiedenheit der Stellung des Gebildes innerhalb
der Ordnung des Nacheinander. Es wird sich spa¨ter zeigen, daß die Ordnung innerhalb der Reihen
genidentischer Gebilde nicht auf die Zeitordnung zuru¨ckzufu¨hren ist, sondern daß der Begriff der
genetischen Reihe wahrscheinlich fundamentaler ist als der der Zeitordnung.” Lewin (1922/1983,
65).
27“Der Ausdruck “Ordnungstypus” soll nicht bedeuten, daß es sich um subjektive, nicht
gegebene, sondern gemachte Ordnungen handelt. Er wird vielmehr in einem aller Aktivita¨t oder
Passivita¨t des Erkenntnissubjektes gegenu¨ber vo¨llig neutralen Sinne benutzt und besagt lediglich,
daß die hier wesentlichen Verschiedenheiten der Existentialbeziehungen Verschiedenheiten der
“inneren Geordnetheit” sind, und zwar weniger was den Grade als was den Typus der Ordnung
anbelangt.” Lewin (1922/1983, 317).
28Lewin (1922/1983, 69).
29Lewin (1922/1983, 73). Cf. also above, footnote 18.
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one, according to Lewin, is the simple relation of existence that makes all other
properties significant.
Thus, as a development of his previous research, Lewin focusses on the ex-
istential relation that grounds the concrete object’s characteristic belonging to a
specific world line. For instance, to determine the temporal succession of a real
series, Lewin starts by defining the direction of the genetic series. Let an and am
be distinct cuts (Schnitte) of a series. If an has derived from am, we can char-
acterise am as “genetically earlier than” an, like in the first example of Figure 1,
where the arrow indicates the direction of the formation. He then introduces Ax-
iom I, which states that a cut of a genetic series occurs in this series only once.30
This means that a genetic series does not loop back on itself and that the chain
cannot be closed. Obviously, a cause cannot be, at the same time, the result of
its own effects. In this framework, the relation of cause to effect clearly does
not cover the many meanings of genidentity. In general, we can speak of a cause
only in association with a conjunction of events, not when considering one single
event.31
Up to now, we have dealt with genidentical sequences considered separately.
In order to fulfil the declared aim of the paper, namely provide a definition of
temporal order, the analysis must be extended to situations where several series
interact. Hence, Lewin exploits the idea that temporal determinations can obtain
where genetic series share some cuts or are linked by other commonly connected
series. To begin with, a series can produce separate series through a “splitting-
off” (Abspaltung) or can be observed as their “reunion” (Vereinigung), as shown
in Figure 1 (second and third example, respectively). Besides, as we shall see, it
can also split off into separate series and then reunite again.
There are cases of genetic series in which the direction of the sequence is
rather obvious (e.g. from an actual egg to the hen resulting from it), but in physics
the points along an existential world line do not unambiguously entail the idea
of antecedency of one relatively to the other. Such instances motivate Lewin to
broaden the concept of genetic series so as to embrace cases presenting a causal
relation within a conjunction of events. To capture these cases, he introduces
the notion of “genetic series of succession” (Genesefolgereihe), for which he also
uses the term “causal series” (Kausalreihe). This type of series is characterised
as follows: we have a genetic series of succession when there is a choice of cuts
such that any two consecutive cuts are genidentical in the same direction, without
the requirement that the other cuts be genidentical all among themselves.32 This
30“Axiom I: Ein Schnitt einer Genesereihe kommt in dieser Reihe nicht mehrmals vor.” Lewin
(1923a, 66).
31Thus, a stone at a time b1 is not the cause of the stone being the same at a time b2. Cf. Lewin
(1922/1983, 72).
32“Eine Reihe, in der sich eine Anzahl von Schnitten so herausgreifen la¨ßt, daß je zwei
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Fig. 1: Antecedency between multiple series cuts, splitting-off, and reunion of
genetic series, Lewin (1923a, 69).
addition allows for the temporal comparison among series that haven’t derived
directly one from the other, but that are instead joined via other series. In this
sense, the concept of Genesefolgereihe enables the univocal determination of a
temporal order on the basis of the structural features of the nets realised by “in-
teracting” series. Thus, Lewin introduces Axiom II which expresses the openness
of causal chains by stating that a genetic series of succession does not lead back
onto itself. This clearly represents an extension of the first Axiom onto the newly
defined class of series.33 Finally, Lewin denotes as “temporal order of the gen-
esis” (zeitliche Geneseordnung) any system-time which has been determined by
means of the relationship of the “one-next-to-the-other” among genetic series of
succession.34
Besides the relation between two series that intersect or part at a certain time,
particular importance is assigned to those series that play the role of “carriers”
or “messengers” (Boten) connecting two separate series (Figure 2, first example).
Their function is similar to that of a clock since they enable a comparison and
thereby a univocal temporal determination between separate series.
As the second (carriers V 2 and V 3) and third example (direction of the arrows
resulting from the two carriers’ system intersecting at x and y with respect to the
direction of the genetic series B) of Figure 2 show, these cases are inconsistent for
they give rise to temporal relations among slices that imply the contradiction of
Axiom II, the one asserting the impossibility of genidentical (therefore, temporal)
aufeinanderfolgende Schnitte genidentisch, und zwar in derselben Richtung genidentisch sind,
ohne daß sa¨mtliche Reihenschnitte untereinander genidentisch zu sein brauchen, heiße “Gene-
sefolgereihe (G-Folgereihe). Die Zeitbeziehung ihrer Glieder heiße: “zeitlich fru¨her” (→) und
“zeitlich spa¨ter” (←).” Lewin (1923a, 67).
33“Axiom II: Eine Genesefolgereihe fu¨hrt beim Fortschreiten in einer Richtung nicht in sich
zuru¨ck.” Lewin (1923a, 67).
34“Ein Zeitsystem, das lediglich durch dieses Axiom u¨ber das Nacheinander in Genesefolgerei-
hen bestimmt wird, sei als “zeitliche Geneseordnung” bezeichnet.” Lewin (1923a, 67).
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Fig. 2: Connection between series via “Botenzu¨ge”, Lewin (1923a, 75).
loops.
Intuitively, we can take the extension to the genetic series of succession to
cover cases in which there are constructs (Gebilde) that are properly speaking not
derived from a certain sequence, but that can be temporally related to it provided
that a continuous chain of genetic series makes their connection effectual. This
specification allows Lewin to articulate the temporal relations between concrete
individual things or events historically ordered through their own temporal paths
when they are (causally) interacting among themselves. Unconnected events can
thus be correlated by a common (causal) series and this is the key to define a tem-
poral order. Lewin’s strong intuition is that such temporal determinations emerge
only on the occasion of conjunctions and interactions of series, so that the struc-
tural features of the resulting net make possible the introduction of an objective
and univocally defined time order. Besides, this net suffices to determine the di-
rection of the causal chain. This is an element that Reichenbach will eventually
appreciate in his “Die Kausalstruktur der Welt und der Unterschied von Vergan-
genheit und Zukunft” (1925).
We have seen that the comparison between series requires some sort of con-
necting device, of which a clock is an obvious realisation. Yet, the “Boten” are not
to be reduced to the usual concept of a clock: this concept provides the additional
feature of a coordination (Zuordnung) with the series of real numbers, a coordi-
nation which is not at all required in Lewin’s model. In a footnote to this passage,
Lewin explicitly refers to Reichenbach’s “Bericht” (1921b) as an example of this
type of coordination, interestingly adding that it follows the same line as Weyl’s.35
35As he writes: “Auch Weyls Definition benutzt entsprechend der Absicht, fu¨r die Metrik
verwendbare Uhren zu bestimmen, Genesereihen (und zwar restlose Genidentita¨tsreihen), deren
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In order to define a “system-time”, in his (1921b) Reichenbach does indeed intro-
duce a notion of “clock”. However, he still considers it fulfilling a purely topolog-
ical function, being an auxiliary concept devoid of metrical meaning and valid for
any arbitrary metric. Reichenbach’s “topological clock” is thus described as any
mechanism with no specific material characterisation “that coordinates each event
to a point according to the sequence of real numbers”.36 Even so, in Lewin’s view
such a move already entails one step further into a more complex stage, where
specific properties of physical processes (like a physical system having a cyclical
period) do play a role. According to the psychologist, such a step is not necessary
and can indeed be dispensed with within his own construction—at least given his
project: a purely topological description of time order without any definition of or
reference to simultaneity. The character of this topological relation is such that a
comparison among cuts and intervals of unconnectible series of events is excluded
by definition. No temporal determinations can be given between separate series
unless metrical considerations come into play. So, the concept of simultaneity is
bound to not fit this construction, which would render it meaningless.37
The temporal metric necessarily presupposes the study of the existential rela-
tions between series, and conversely this study is supplemented by the metric in
two respects: on the one hand, it is only by virtue of the metric that we can speak
of temporal relations expressed by numbers; on the other, the metric allows us to
consider relations of temporal lengths.
Lewin’s framework embodies the very general type of structural relations that
can be evinced only on the basis of the existential relation that genidentity implies.
In that sense, Reichenbach’s use of the concept of “first signal”, as we shall see,
does not represent anything more than a token case—comparable to the genealogi-
cal sequences in biology—of this most general type of relation. Lewin’s construc-
tion should, therefore, be interpreted like a foundation for Reichenbach’s, who
still uses relations derived from characteristic properties (Eigenschaftsbeziehun-
gen) of a particular physical process (a light signal). What makes the notion of the
signal operative is precisely the net of which Lewin has formalised the structural
properties.
Most likely, Lewin’s background in psychology and hence viewpoint from
Schnitte spezielle physikalische Eigenschaftsbeziehungen zeigen, wie sie in der zeitlichen Gene-
seordnung außer Ansatz bleiben.” Lewin (1923a, footnote 1 to p. 79).
36Reichenbach (1921b/2006, 47).
37“Die Beschra¨nktheit der zeitlichen Geneseordnung gegenu¨ber der gewo¨hnlichen Zeitordnung
zeigt sich darin, daß sie die Ordinalbeziehung nur zwischen zeitverschiedenen Ereignissen zu
bestimmen gestattet (also nur die Beziehungen “fru¨her” und “spa¨ter”, aber nicht die “Gleichzeit-
igkeit” getrennte Ereignisse) und die Zeitla¨ngenbeziehung nur zwischen Geschehnisreihen, von
denen die ku¨rzere ganz “innerhalb derselben Zeit” stattfindet muß wie die la¨ngere, jedoch nicht
zwischen Genesereihen, die ganz zu verschiedenen Zeiten stattfinden.” Lewin (1923a, 78).
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which he studied the notion of genidentity granted him a more general perspective
on the whole issue than Reichenbach. Conversely, the very specialised context in
physics in which Reichenbach worked made him unable to see the form of primor-
dial relations analysed by Lewin, which lay below his alleged “elementary facts”.
In the next subsection, we will see how Reichenbach understands his model, his
objections to Lewin, and their consequent discussions.
3.2 From Genidentity to the Mark Principle
3.2.1 Genidentity in Reichenbach’s Early Works
The term “genidentity” is introduced by Reichenbach in his Habilitation thesis,
Relativita¨tstheorie und Erkenntnis apriori (1920), where it appears in the form of
an a priori principle of cognition. The philosophical background of this mono-
graph is particularly important, so let us just briefly recall one of its central fea-
tures, the suggested “liberalised” version of Kant’s synthetic a priori. In this writ-
ing, Reichenbach still defends the idea of constitutive, yet revisable a priori prin-
ciples of knowledge and accordingly proposes a distinction between axioms of
connection and axioms of coordination.38 The axioms of coordination are related
to the conceptual part of knowledge and are constitutive of the concept of phys-
ical object in that they determine the meaning of the axioms of connection, the
laws of physics. Thus, they determine the rules of their application to reality, i.e.,
the rules of the connection. The specificity of genidentity as a constitutive princi-
ple is that of allowing us to indicate “how physical concepts are to be connected
in sequences in order to define ‘the same thing remaining identical with itself in
time’.”39 As an example, Reichenbach mentions the fact that when we speak of
the path of an electron, we have to consider it as the selfsame object through the
passage of time. In other terms, we assume its identity through time, and there-
fore make use of the principle of genidentity as a conceptual presupposition. To
be sure, among the cognitive principles, the principle of genidentity (like that of
probability) plays a specific and most fundamental role. Being in fact presupposed
by a number of other coordinating principles—especially those related to the pro-
cess of measuring—genidentity seems to involve a higher level of coordination.
As such, it is a condition of the possibility for utilising other principles and, there-
fore, appears to have a “meta-constitutive” function.40
As previously mentioned, when introducing this term in his (1920) Reichen-
38In recent years, Reichenbach’s conception of the cognitive principles has been increasingly
discussed after Michael Friedman’s attempt to revive his original idea. See Friedman (2001) and
references therein.
39Reichenbach (1920/1965, 53).
40On these aspects, see Padovani (2011).
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bach makes explicit reference to Lewin’s Die Verwandtschaftsbegriffe in Biologie
und Physik und die Darstellung vollsta¨ndiger Stammba¨ume (1920), where gen-
identity is not considered. In the same year, Reichenbach writes a review of this
essay, very much appreciative of the analytical methodology used by the author
in the prospect of a positive turn in the philosophy of natural sciences.41 Despite
that title, he points out, the idea of a genetic series in physics is not examined by
Lewin in this early essay. Reichenbach accordingly argues that also in physics
there are certainly interesting examples of genetic series—like those representing
the existence of a material thing in time, i.e., the world line of a material point—
unfortunately not treated by Lewin (1920).42 However, as we have seen in the
previous section, Lewin’s idea is actually that the world line of a material point is
contingent, so to speak, on the genetic series, which is expressed by the existential
relation embodied by the concrete events’ persistence through time. Reichenbach,
to the contrary and from the outset, tends to interpret the genetic series tout court
as the world line.
In 1921, Reichenbach starts working on an axiomatisation of Einstein’s the-
ory of space and time, which he will finally achieve in his Axiomatik (1924a). He
will write a brief report on the occasion of the famous Bad Nauheim meeting of
the German Society of Natural Scientists in 1921. In this “Bericht” (1921b), Rei-
chenbach proposes the idea of a light geometry, a geometry based on the physical
properties of light and world line of a material point, independently of any relation
to other material objects. One crucial feature of this project is the distinction be-
tween light and matter axioms. The first ones define the light geometry whereas
the second ones “imply the identity of the developed ‘light geometry’ with the
space-time theory of rigid rods and clocks”.43 The other fundamental trait of this
report is epistemological in nature and entails a first step towards conventionalism
by drawing a clear-cut distinction between empirical axioms and arbitrary coor-
dinative definitions. Finally, synthetic a priori principles are no longer considered
41Reichenbach (1921a). Here, he also correctly indicates the forthcoming volume Der Begriff
der Genese. At the end of 1920, Lewin read a draft of this review before it was sent to the editor
of the journal. Later, he wrote to Reichenbach in order to clarify some crucial points of his com-
parative approach. In the first phase of this correspondence, the point at issue was Reichenbach’s
(mis)understanding of the intrinsic difference among the notions of genetic series used in the var-
ious sciences—a difference which cannot be reduced to each science’s degree of development,
as Lewin made clear: “Es liegt mir an und fu¨r sich sehr am Herzen, zu betonen, dass der Unter-
schied der genetischen Reihentypen in Physik und Biologie nicht auf dem verschiedenen Entwick-
lungsgrad dieser Wissenschaften beruht[, vielmehr grade etwas ist, was in der Einstellung einer
Wissenschaft konstant bleibt.] 2 Sa¨tze in den Referat ko¨nnten nun leicht dahin missverstanden
werden, dass gerade dies meine Meinung ist.” ASP, HR 015-57-14, Lewin to Reichenbach, 23
December 1920. Reichenbach must have changed his review accordingly.
42Reichenbach (1921a, 51).
43Reichenbach (1921b/2006, 46).
17
and are turned into conventional definitions—as a matter of fact, a conceptual
shift that is quite problematic for some “meta-constitutive” principles like gen-
identity. In Reichenbach’s view, this geometry has an important advantage over
other physical geometries, as he explains in a letter to Moritz Schlick in January
1922:
“I think that especially the axiomatic analysis will be of interest to
you. It provides a validation of conventionalism, but it clearly reveals
those facts that also conventionalism cannot interpret. Particularly
remarkable is the fact that it allowed for the complete elimination of
rigid rods and clocks. I managed to define the entire metrics simply
by using light signals. This is of course also a real definition, but
one can actually show that light suffices as reality, it even enables to
define rigidity.”44 Reichenbach to Schlick, 18 January 1922 (Schlick
Collection)
While in this brief report the light signal is taken as the basis of the definition of
time order,45 in the Axiomatik the axioms of time order will have another starting
point, the following definition:
“Definition 1. Of two events E1 and E2 happening at P, the event E2 is
called later than E1 if a signal chain can be chosen in such a way that
its departure coincides with E1 and its return with E2. In this case, E1
is called earlier than E2.
Axiom I, 1. There is no signal chain such that its departure and its
return coincide at P.” Reichenbach (1924a/1969, 29).
With the help of what will be later known as the “mark principle”, Reichenbach
clarifies the notion of light signal: a light signal is a physical process or event
traveling from a point P to a point P′ and having the property that when this event
44“Ich glaube, dass die axiomatische Analyse Sie besonders interessieren wird. Sie liefert
natu¨rlich eine Besta¨tigung des Konventionalismus, aber sie deckt auch jene Tatsachen auf, an
denen auch der Konventionalismus nicht interpretieren kann. Besonders merkwu¨rdig ist es, dass
es mo¨glich war, die starren Masssta¨be u. Uhren vo¨llig zu eliminieren. Ich konnte allein durch Be-
nutzung von Lichtsignalen die ganze Metrik definieren. Das ist natu¨rlich auch eine Realdefinition,
aber es zeigt sich eben, dass das Licht als Realita¨t genu¨gt, es vermag sogar die Starrheit zu
definieren.” Reichenbach to Schlick, 18 January 1922 (Schlick Collection).
45“1. Axioms of time order. We first define the time order at a point. A light signal sent
from a point A to an arbitrary point B (which may be moving) is reflected and returns back to A.
Definition 1. The departure of the signal from A is called “earlier” (written<) than its return to A.”
Reichenbach (1921b/2006, 46). I shall point out that Reichenbach does not seem to be acquainted
with a similar attempt to define the temporal order carried out by the mathematician Robb already
in his A Theory of Time and Space (1914).
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is marked at P, the mark will also be observed at P′. In this case, “the word
‘signal’ pinpoints this very property because it means a transmission of a sign.
The word ‘causal chain’ is also frequently used in such instances”.46 The physi-
cal world consists of causal chains, whose structural relations can be formulated
as topological and metrical axioms. Metrical axioms are statements about certain
topologically specified chains (or first signals). Topological axioms are statements
defining time order and concerning the possibility of connecting all space points
by causal chains. The topological axioms defining time order assert that no causal
chain is closed. If we possess a time order, it is indeed thanks to the causal chain.
Thus, time provides the description of “an objective state of the physical world
just like any other scheme of order—for instance, genealogical order.” So, he
concludes, “time is the order type [Ordnungstypus] of causal chains.”47 The allu-
sion to the genealogical order and to the notion of “Ordnungstypus” is clearly an
echo of Lewin’s work (not mentioned at this point, by the way) but it is not de-
veloped here. Instead, it will be developed in his essay on the theory of motion in
Newton, Leibniz and Huygens (1924b), published in the same year. In the analy-
sis of the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, Reichenbach takes Leibniz’s reference
to genealogy as an opportunity to discuss the parallelism between genealogical
and causal order, eventually citing Lewin:
“In a genealogical order, every individual has a ‘place’, and exactly
as in a spatial order the place of an individual indicates nothing but
certain relations he bears to other individuals. [. . . ] The genealogical
order schematizes the structure of ancestral relations between individ-
uals, and is not something else existing in addition to this structure.
[. . . ] According to the investigations by K. Lewin, we may regard the
genealogical order as the space-time order of biological evolution, in
exactly the same sense as we have to regard the causal order as the
space-time order of physics.” Reichenbach (1924b/1959, 54–55).
As I pointed out before, genealogical sequences are comparable to light signals
in the sense that they both represent a token case of the more primordial struc-
ture type expressing the actual, temporal (i.e., causal) order, which Lewin has
constructed in his (1923a).
Probably to avoid any Kantian overtones, the notion of genidentity no longer
appears in Reichenbach’s Axiomatik. Its role is transferred onto the mark princi-
ple that he defines only after introducing the notion of light signal. Direct refer-
ence to genidentity and its fundamental significance will be made explicitly in Die
Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre (1928). The return to the concept of genidentity
46Reichenbach (1924a/1969, 27).
47Reichenbach (1924a/1969, 15–16).
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will be the result of an exchange with Lewin, but will not be without consequences
from a philosophical point of view, as I shall briefly highlight in the concluding
section. Let us first analyse their correspondence.
3.2.2 Reichenbach’s Correspondence with Lewin
Reichenbach and Lewin were very close friends and colleagues. Most likely, Rei-
chenbach informed Lewin about the larger manuscript on the axiomatics of time
on which he was working in that period. In his first letter related to the topic of the
topology of time, dated 17 March 1922,48 Lewin addressed Reichenbach to thank
him for sending his “Zeitaxiomatik”,49 and for informing him of the progress of
his work about the genidentical series.50
The following letter, sent in September 1922, accompanied a copy of the
manuscript of “Die zeitliche Geneseordnung” (1923a), which to Lewin’s mind
represented “a good completion” (eine ganz gute Erga¨nzung) of Reichenbach’s
axiomatics of time. In the diplomatic terms used by Lewin, this “completion”
actually meant a clarification of the lacking elements of Reichenbach’s topolog-
ical foundation. Lewin deemed in fact his approach to be starting from the most
fundamental level of analysis, differently than Reichenbach’s. As he wrote:
“I see which time order arises merely on the basis of the genetic series
in terms of genidentical series. Thereby, I would like to desist from
presupposing formally the concept of ‘simultaneity’ in the definition
of ‘complete’ genidentity. [. . . ] Yet, I would like to take the genetic
series as a basis by emphasising its peculiarity, and not to use any spe-
cific ‘relation of property or of magnitude’. The question is how far I
can go simply on the ground of the existential relation of the genetic
series. I obtained a ‘general time order’ of very limited use, which
involves relations of time length (that are of course only of ‘topolog-
ical’ nature, here). On the other hand, it is of very general nature
because it does not make any assumptions about constancy, velocity
or physical kinds of events, ‘reference systems’ or carriers, and con-
stitutes a foundation of any factual determination of time. [. . . ] Your
axiomatisation treats just all the properties of time that I do not take
48The Pittsburgh Archives contain many letters from Lewin to Reichenbach, but unfortunately
no replies have been found to the letters we are using in this section.
49This manuscript represents the first draft of the Axiomatik, which was originally supposed to
be dealing more specifically with time. Cf. ASP, HR 023-35-01.
50As he wrote: “Ich bin dabei, mir die Beziehungen zum Genidentita¨tsreihenbegriff zu u¨ber-
legen. [. . . ] Die Stellung der Zeit als Parameter der genetischen Reihen lo¨st vielleicht gewisse
Schwierigkeiten, die beim Gedanken des Raumpunktes bestehen.” ASP, HR 015-57-13, Lewin to
Reichenbach, 17 March 1922.
20
into consideration.”51 ASP, HR 015-57-12, Lewin to Reichenbach,
September 1922.
This motivation notwithstanding, Reichenbach criticised Lewin’s proposal in
his Axiomatik. His disagreement is basically centred around the concept of signal
and the corresponding definition of simultaneity, and it results in two footnotes,
one in § 5 (“The Concepts of Real Point and Signal”) and the other in § 7 (“Axioms
of the Comparison of Time”).
In the first footnote, Reichenbach mentioned Lewin after introducing the def-
inition of signal as a physical process of “sign transmission” that we have seen
above:52
“In earlier presentations I started with light signals. The validity of
theorem 9 for any real events then follows from the fact that the light
signal PP′ arrives at P′ earlier than any other signal departing simulta-
neously from P (limiting character of the velocity of light). K. Lewin
drew my attention to the fact that all properties of signals can be for-
mulated directly for any signal (Zeitschr. f. Phys., vol. 13 [1923],
p. 62). Starting from differently oriented investigations concerning
genealogical sequences, Lewin (Begriff der Genese [Berlin: Springer,
1922]) arrived at a conception of time order similar to mine.” Rei-
chenbach (1924a/1969, 27).
As in (1924b), Reichenbach correctly associates the outcomes obtained by means
of his notion of signal with Lewin’s genealogical sequences. Yet, it is clear that
Reichenbach keeps considering his own level as the most elementary, and that he
51“Ich sehe zu, welche Zeitordnung ergibt sich lediglich auf Grund der Genesereihen im Sinne
der Genidentita¨tsreihen. Dabei mo¨chte ich davon absehen, dass ich bei der Definition des Begriffs
der “restlosen” Genidentita¨t formal den Begriff der “Gleichzeitigkeit” voraussetze. [. . . ] Sondern
ich mo¨chte die Genesereihe zugrundelegen unter Betonung ihrer Eigenheit, keine bestimmten
“Eigenschaft-” oder quantitativen “Gro¨ssenbeziehungen” zu verwenden. Die Frage lautet, wie
weit komme ich auf Grund lediglich der Existentialbeziehung der Genesereihen. Ich erhielt eine
“allgemeine Zeitordnung” von sehr beschra¨nkter Anwendung, was Zeitla¨ngenbeziehungen (die
hier natu¨rlich nur “topologischer” Natur sind) betrifft. Anderseits ist sie sehr allgemeiner Natur,
weil sie keine Annahmen u¨ber Konstanz, Geschwindigkeit oder physikalische Art der Ereignisse,
“Bezugssysteme” oder Boten macht und bildet so eine Grundlage fu¨r jede faktische Zeitbestim-
mung. [. . . ] Ihre Axiomatik geht ja gerade auf alle die Eigentu¨mlichkeiten der Zeit, die ich ausser
Acht lasse.” ASP, HR 015-57-12, Lewin to Reichenbach, September 1922
52As he points out in the previous footnote, the fact is that there is an epistemological problem
related to the concept of mark. Interestingly, here, Reichenbach writes that “for our purposes the
concept of ordinary language suffices. This concept indicates already that the mark at P′ is not
exactly the same as the mark at P, but shares only certain fundamental features. The mark may be
distorted (sounds over the telephone). We shall leave open the question of whether a reference to
the concept of Gestalt is necessary.” Reichenbach (1924a/1969, 27).
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holds his notion of signal to be comparable to Lewin’s genetic series. However,
as we have seen, in Lewin’s work the genetic series provide a primordial level of
analysis that is meant to be more fundamental than Reichenbach’s—a point that
Reichenbach doesn’t seem to be willing to admit at this point.53
Theorem 9, presented a few pages later, presupposes all previously defined
topological axioms of the time order and the comparison of time, and it asserts
that simultaneity can be defined from a purely topological point of view “in such a
way that a continuous positive time interval is assigned to every physical process
(signal, causal chain)”, that is, provided that a univocal coordination be estab-
lished between the order of temporal sequences and the sequence of real numbers
(Theorem 2). Theorem 9, according to Reichenbach, “contains the most impor-
tant topological problem of simultaneity. Only this theorem permits the consistent
application of definition 154 in a uniform continuous order of time.”55
The second footnote where Lewin is mentioned by Reichenbach follows this
attempt to show that his own definition of simultaneity is of a topological and
not of a metrical nature. We have seen that Lewin deemed this kind of coordi-
nation to already imply a step beyond the purely topological dimension, and that
it was therefore not to be regarded as so fundamental as his. However, Reichen-
bach contended that Lewin was mistaken in regarding simultaneity as a metrical
determination.
“This is the reason—he argued—why [Lewin] misrepresents my ear-
lier investigation,56 which also begins with the topological problem
of time; in this publication axioms I and II are topological axioms.
The clock introduced by definition 257 has only topological quali-
ties because of the arbitrariness of the metric. The difference be-
tween Lewin’s investigations and my own lies in another direction,
as was revealed in a personal discussion: whereas my axioms make
assertions about all physically possible signals and my ‘there exist’
means ‘except for technical difficulties they can be produced exper-
imentally’, Lewin restricts himself to assertions about actual signals
and does not speak of possible ones. Therefore, Lewin’s investigation
cannot (and will not) go as far as mine, not even topologically. Above
53As he makes clear, “[t]hat signals exist, that we can produce them, send them to a given real
point, combine them, and reflect them are elementary facts [elementare Tatsache]; axioms I and
II contain everything concerning these facts that is necessary for the construction of the order of
time.” Reichenbach (1924a/1969, 28).
54See above, footnote 45.
55Reichenbach (1924a/1969, 39).
56Reichenbach (1921b).
57In the Bericht, Definition 2 is the first one of the second group of axioms, those regarding the
comparison of time, which include the above-mentioned definition of the topological clock.
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all, the concept of first signal cannot occur in the sense of a limit.
Cf. Lewin’s report about his studies in Physikalische Berichte [Lewin
(1923c)].” Reichenbach (1924a/1969, 39).
At the beginning of 1924, Reichenbach sent the final draft of the Axiomatik
to his colleague in Berlin. In a letter of clarification, Lewin strongly emphasised,
once more, that his topology represented a supplement to Reichenbach’s, and was
definitely neither a substitute nor a similar attempt of limited application. This
is a positive aspect in Lewin’s standpoint that Reichenbach continued not to be
willing to concede. Certainly, as Lewin remarked, the distinction between the
topological and the metrical must be regarded as secondary with respect to the
distinction between actual and possible. But it is precisely the latter, along with
the fact that Lewin deals with the actual order derived by genidentical series, that
rendered his approach more fundamental and not just alternative, as he clarified
in the above-cited report on his own work published in the Physikalische Berichte
in autumn 1923.58
There, Lewin presents the essential elements of his topology of time, namely
the fact that temporal relations can obtain from actual processes and lead to a
definition of temporal order if we simply consider, in mereological terms, the
formations or events that follow one from the other by means of the existential
sequences. The peculiarity of this definition of temporal order is that it does not
depend on the specific physical nature of the genetic series connected, or whether,
for instance, we are talking about light or matter transport. Once more, Lewin
underlines that no consideration of speed, measure or proportion between phys-
ical values or even of simultaneity between sections of sequences is taken into
account. In this sense, any change in the genetic series taken as reference does not
affect the topological relations derived. So, he concludes, each metrical temporal
determination (including the ones defined by the theory of relativity) should in
principle presuppose his more basic approach, the only one leading to the funda-
mental structural net of temporal relations.59
58“Ich habe leider die Arbeit in den beiden Tagen noch nicht sehr eingehend studieren ko¨nnen
und daher im wesentlichen die Anmerkungen gelesen. Ich glaube, es ist Ihnen noch nicht ganz
deutlich geworden, dass ich wirklich eine gegen Ihre Axiomatik betra¨chtlich verschiedenes Ziel
verfolgt habe. Dass der Unterschied: topologisch–metrisch sekunda¨r ist gegenu¨ber dem Unter-
schied: wirklich–mo¨glich kommt schon in meinem Eigenbericht [Lewin (1923c)] in den Physik.
“Berichten” zum Ausdruck, den ich Ihnen beilege (bitte zuru¨cksenden!!). Dass meine zeitliche
Geneseordnung weniger weitreichend ist als alle auf “Mo¨glichkeiten” bezugnehmende Zeitord-
nungen, habe ich ja immer zu betont. Es ist also irrefu¨rend, von “nicht erscho¨pfend” zu reden!
Denn diese Beschra¨nkung auf das “Wirkliche” gibt der zeit[lichen] G[enese]-Ordnung m. E. ja ger-
ade die Fundamentalita¨t gegenu¨ber allen auf “Mo¨glichkeiten” bezugnehmenden Ansa¨tzen.” ASP,
HR 016-36-13, Lewin to Reichenbach, 24 January 1924.
59Lewin (1923c, 977).
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Lewin’s letter dated January 1924 goes along the same line and in order to
avoid further misunderstandings accordingly presents a list of suggested correc-
tions to the two footnotes where his work is mentioned in Reichenbach’s axioma-
tisation. As far as the first one is concerned, Lewin notes that his notion of signal
does not correspond to the one used by Reichenbach, especially since he does not
need the additional property provided by the mark principle, already implied by
the concept of genetic series.60 Clearly, Reichenbach originally understood the
genetic series as having the limited character of some existential connections that
for no reason can ground an axiomatic account of the topology of time, which up
to this moment he still interprets as regarding only possible—i.e., not necessarily
actual, contrary to Lewin—connections. As Reichenbach points out in the second
footnote, the divergences between them relate to the kind of events they want to
account for. In his letter, Lewin correspondingly spells out their specificity:
“In the footnote to p. 63 of my work, which you are most likely refer-
ring to, I did not talk about the metrical character of your work, but,
rather, about the fact that you make use of property relations. This
applies in any case at least to the light signals. And even now, for in-
stance with Axiom I, 261 you still make assumptions about certain say
quasi-continuous distributions of the physical reality (without which
that axiom, as far as I can see, would not hold for a finite velocity of
the signals). In principle, [these distributions] derive from the sphere
of conditions of the temporal order of the genesis. [. . . ] The earlier
version appears to assign the temporal order of the genesis purposes
that it does not have. Also, I have always explicitly stressed ([1923a,]
p. 80 bottom) that it is possible to say more from a topological point
of view with the help of a (variable or constant) metrics.”62 ASP, HR
60“Ad Anmk. S. 20: ‘der freilich — beschreibt.’: streichen! Ich sehe nicht den Sinn des
Satzes, da ich gar nicht eigentlich von “Signalen” in Ihrem Sinne rede, z. B. brauche ich nicht
die Erkennbarkeit der Eigenschaft des Signals PP′P, dass es P′ erreicht hat; resp. die fehlenden
Eigenschaften sind ja durch die Definition als Genesereihen gegeben, deren Axiome in meinem
Buch angegeben sind. Dort steht u¨brigens auch was von den “Kennzeichen” (S. 15 u. a.), wenn
auch nur in Bezug auf feste Ko¨rper.” ASP, HR 016-36-13, Lewin to Reichenbach, 24 January
1924.
61Axiom I,2 is the axiom of connection of temporal series and it is so defined: “Axiom I, 2. For
any two events E1 and E2 at P there exists always a signal whose departure coincides with E1 (or
E2) and whose return coincides with E2 (or E1).” Reichenbach (1924a/1969, 30).
62Ich habe in Anmk. S. 63 meiner Arbeit, die Sie offenbar meinen, nicht von dem metrischen
Charakter Ihrer Arbeit gesprochen, sondern davon, dass Sie “Eigenschaftsbeziehungen” mitbe-
nutzen. Das traf auf die Lichtsignale zumindest auf jeden Fall zu. Und auch jetzt machen Sie z. B.
mit Axiom I,2 noch Annahmen u¨ber gewisse, sagen wir quasikontinuierliche Verteilungen der
physikalischen Realita¨t (ohne die das Axiom, soviel ich sehe, bei endlicher Geschwindigkeit der
Signale nicht gelten wu¨rde), die u¨ber die Voraussetzungsspha¨re der zeit[lichen] G[enese]-Ordnung
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016-36-13, Lewin to Reichenbach, 24 January 1924.
According to Lewin, making use of light signals as the starting point of a
topological account of time actually calls for more analyses concerning the spe-
cific properties of the physical process assumed as the elementary fact. This fact
already entails a further level of elaboration in comparison to his own “minimal-
ist” topological approach, let alone the introduction of a “topological clock” in
order to define simultaneity. Thus, with his topological construction Lewin ob-
tains much with a restricted number of assumptions (namely, only the assumption
of genidentity as an existential relation), whereas Reichenbach has to introduce
light signals supplemented by the mark principle, virtually presupposing all the
considerations about genidentity explored by Lewin without using any concept of
clock.
Despite what he wrote to Schlick in the missive we have seen above, Reichen-
bach neither provided the most basic account, nor did he accept Lewin’s criti-
cism concerning the unanalysed assumptions upon which his construction actually
rests.
4 Reichenbach’s Return to Genidentity
Reichenbach adopted a different perspective in his innovative work “Die Kausal-
struktur der Welt” in 1925, when he eventually started formalising the causal cor-
relations between actual series of events and applied his probabilistic approach
to Lewin’s topological model in order to define the direction of time. The idea
here was to develop a topological account of the probabilistic implications that
can be obtained starting from an analysis of the behaviour of interacting causal
chains. Most importantly, now Reichenbach puts forward—clearly influenced by
Lewin—a description of the causal processes in terms of nets. It is in fact in
this paper that, for the very first time, he uses the so-called fork asymmetry ac-
count, which he will amend and improve only at the end of his life, in The Direc-
tion of Time (1956). In its basic form, this 1925 account relies quite consistently
on Lewin’s analysis of the splitting and intersecting series, which we have seen
above. Following Lewin, here Reichenbach emphasises that only the relations
between actual events belonging to different series can provide a good ground
for identifying the direction of causal chains. The direction of time “can first be
prinzipiell hinausgehen. [. . . ] Die alte Fassung scheint der z[eitlichen] G[enese]-O[rdnung] Ab-
sichten unterzulegen, die sie nicht hat. Auch dass man mit Hilfe einer (variabel oder konstanten)
Metrik topologisch mehr aussagen kann als die z[eitliche] G[enese]-O[rdnung], habe ich selbst
ausdru¨cklich hervorgehoben (S. 80 unten).” ASP, HR 016-36-13, Lewin to Reichenbach, 24 Jan-
uary 1924.
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gained with the emergence of connecting points. In this way we are led to base
the temporal order upon the characteristics of a net structure.”63
After this “turn”, the principle of genidentity will reappear in all its signif-
icance in Die Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre (1928), where it is regarded as
a fundamental axiom, but of empirical nature. Let us recall that Reichenbach’s
causal chains presuppose, at the more primordial level highlighted by Lewin,
some form of genidentity as a condition of their definability. In his famous book
of 1928, Reichenbach refines some of the issues involved by the consideration
of causal chains and the related notion of genidentity. Different states can be
genidentical only if they are causally related. As he explains, “this conception
agrees with our definition of causal connection, which considers the causal chain
a signal, i.e. the transmission of a mark”.64 In the section devoted to the definition
of time order, Reichenbach insists in particular on the necessity of considering the
causal chains open, and he addresses the question whether closed causal chains
could occur or even merely be imagined at all. Although this could not be ex-
cluded a priori, he points out that the uniqueness of time order as well as our
familiar concept of identity through time of the individual would be lost. The
properties of the causal chains fundamentally underlie our concept of individual-
ity, and this concept, Reichenbach goes on, “originates in the fact that there are
no closed causal chains” (p. 142). If the causal chains were closed, the principle
of genidentity would be violated, and we should admit cases in which a person
could meet his/her former self. However, this has never been observed and would
moreover be rather difficult to accept. It is in fact our concept of individuality that
requires that the causal chains be open. In other terms, genidentity must be as-
sumed as a very deep principle of our physical knowledge (ein sehr tiefes Prinzip
der Naturerkenntnis) because
“[i]t enables us to speak of a unique time order and a unique now-
point. Furthermore, it makes possible the concept of the individual
that remains identical during the passage of time. It is therefore the
most important axiom regarding time order, and we realise to what an
extent the familiar concept of time order is based on this characteristic
of causality. Of course, this axiom is a result of experience [es ist klar,
daß es sich in diesem Axiom um einen Erfahrungssatz handeln kann].”
Reichenbach (1928/1958, 142–143).
This principle is a fundamental presupposition of our knowledge for it allows
us to preserve our most important concept of individuality. Despite its funda-
63Reichenbach (1925/1978, 93). Due to space limitations, we cannot follow these issues in
detail here, nor can we follow the fate of genidentity in (1956) where genidentity still plays a
central role.
64Reichenbach (1928/1958, 271).
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mental role, Reichenbach would say, it cannot be considered necessary as there
cannot be necessary principles in nature. Nor can we take it to be a convention.
Thus, Reichenbach labels it as an “empirical principle”. The justification is by
exclusion and in line with his shift towards conventionalism. Since genidentity,
as a principle, cannot be deemed to be conventional, nor can it be interpreted as
a methodological assumption, it must be empirical. In this way, the risk of inter-
preting it as an otherwise inexplicable principle is seemingly avoided. Yet, this
justification clearly sounds quite artificial. To be sure, the principle of genidentity
really looks like an anomalous principle within this framework and to define it
as a mere empirical principle would not explain why we rely on it as a principle
grounding our notion of individuality, as Reichenbach emphasises. In this sense,
as a (temporary) condition of possibility of our knowledge of nature, it still has
the same features it used to have when it was introduced in Relativita¨tstheorie
und Erkenntnis apriori (1920), namely those of a synthetic, yet revisable a pri-
ori principle—which is tantamount to reintroducing constitutive principles by the
back door.
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